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1 Introduction
An often cited concern with individual transferable quota management programs is that randomness
in the harvesting process causes mismatch between a fisherman’s catch and quota holdings (Copes,
1986). When this occurs, fishermen may be forced to discard overages, i.e., harvests in excess
of quota holdings, at sea to avoid regulatory penalty. Discarding problems could be magnified
if fishermen must balance catches and quotas across multiple species (Squires et al., 1998). In
response to the problem, multiple species quota management programs often include provisions
that allow or encourage fishermen to land overages instead of discarding them. Following recent
literature we will referred to these provisions as quota-balancing mechanisms, or QBMs.
The intent of QBMs is to reduce discards that result from random catch-quota imbalance.1 One
important consideration is that fishermen have opportunity to influence the mix of species inter-
cepted by their fishing gear. The choice of fishing location, date, and depth, gear type, baits,
etc. allow fishermen to target species they wish to land, and avoid others. Uncertainty in the
harvesting process can remain. However, when fishermen can control, at least in part, the mix of
species harvested, quota flexibility permits behavioral responses that are important in harvest and
discard outcomes. Since counter-factual observation is not possible, i.e., we do not observe fishing
behavior with and without QBMs in place, it is diﬃcult to know if QBMs help meet their intended
management goal.
We introduce a model of a stochastic, multiple-species harvest technology to study discard incentives
under various QBMs currently in use in quota-managed fisheries. Our analysis will focus on quota
flexibility and real time quota trading.2 Quota flexibility involves a provision whereby a fisherman is
permitted to land any species within a specified group of species under a common quota. The motive
is to help fishermen match random catches and quotas within the group of species. Real time quota
trades are a form of QBM which combat random catch-quota imbalance by spreading uncertainty
across a larger number of fishermen. Trading eﬀectively eliminates idiosyncratic uncertainty facing
individual fishermen. Singh and Weninger (2012) show that frictionless quota trading leads to
catch/quota balance at the industry level, and minimum harvest costs for the fleet.
Our results show that flexibility provisions in a multiple species setting do no eliminate discards
of catch overages and can create unintended problems for fishery managers. Flexibility invites
fishermen to target species that pay higher prices at the dock, or that more abundant and/or less
costly to harvest. We show that discards can remain under quota flexibility and may even increase
relative to the no-flexibility case under some prices and cost structures. Moreover, because harvests
depend on prices and the targeting cost structure under flexibility provisions, elements diﬃcult to
observe or predict, managers loose control of the aggregate harvest levels in the fishery. These
problems do not arise under a standard, non-flexible, quota design. We also show that discarding is
absent under a standard quota design when fishermen can freely trade quota. Because frictionless
quota trading eliminates discards, fishermen meet aggregate harvest targets at minimum cost. The
1Sanchirico et al. 2006 discuss quota-balancing mechanisms currently used in rights-based fisheries throughout the
world. Amendment 29 to the Reef Fish Fishery Management Plan (Gulf of Mexico Fisheries Management Council,
and NOAA 2008), recently adopted a quota program for red and gag grouper which allows flexibility in the mix of
species that can be landed. This regulation is intended to reduce discards due to unanticipated catch-quota imbalance.
2Regulations governing quota transferability are required in U.S. fisheries under the Magnuson-Stevens Act Reau-
thorization of 2006. Some quota managment programs impose strict limits on quota transferability. These restrictions
address concerns of concentration in quota markets, unwanted changes in the spatial distribution of harvests, unwanted
changes in the composition of the fishing fleet, quota ownership by individuals or agencies who do not participate
directly in the fishery, or to aid with monitoring (Anderson and Holliday, 2007). See Singh and Weninger 2012 for a
complete analysis of trading frictions in quota-managed fisheries.
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results provide important insights for improving the design of rights-based management programs
in multiple-species fisheries.
The next section introduces the model and regulations and derives optimal fishing outcomes, i.e.,
harvests, discards, quota prices and input allocations. Four QBMs provisions are examined. Section
3 present numerical results. Conclusions and extensions are discussed in section 4.
2 The model
A continuum of fishermen conduct harvesting operations during a single period. The composition
of the fish stock is given; it does not change through natural forces or through the eﬀects of fishing.
There are two separate stocks. A stock may represent a distinct fish species or a size, sex or age
class. Hereafter, we use the term stock rather than species to express this added generality.
The harvest of the two stocks is given by:
(h1, h2) = [A1
n
1 + sin(a
π
2
)
o
φγ , A2
³
1 + cos(a
π
2
)
´
(1− φ)γ ] · zβ, (1)
where z is a public input which we take to be a scalar for notational convenience. The input
determines the scale of the total harvest. The parameter a determines the mix harvested stocks.
Following Singh and Weninger (2009) we let φ ≡ x1x1+x2 denote the share of first stock in the
sea; A1 > 0, A2 > 0, and γ ∈ (0, 1) are parameters.3 It is easily seen that for φ > 0, a = −1
⇒ {h1, h2} = {0, A2 (1− φ)α} zβ and a = 2 ⇒ {h1, h2} = {A1φα, 0} zβ. The harvest technology
exhibits the property of weak output disposability. Figure 1 below depicts the technology for
A1 = A2 = 1, γ = 0.8, a fixed z, and a ∈ [−1, 2].
Harvesting uncertainty is introduced as follows. We assume that at the time z is selected, the
fisherman knows only the distribution of the stock abundance as reflected by the parameter φ.
3As γ gets smaller the output sets for various values of φ are closer to each other. As γ gets large, they expand
apart. Note that γ = 0.8 turns out to be the parameter value that, for a wide range of φ = 0.2 − 0.8, induces the
fishermen to choose targeting mix a as close to φ as possible (for identical producitivties A1 and A2 and prices of the
two stocks).
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Once at sea, an actual realization of φ occurs. Fishermen then choose the target parameter a, e.g.,
adjust fishing depths, trawling speed, fine—scale fishing locations, to intercept a preferred mix of
each stock. The idea is that when z is chosen, for example, when a fishing trip is planned, true
stock conditions are unknown. When fishing begins the mix of stocks under the boat is revealed. At
this point the fisherman can undertake additional steps to influence the mix of stocks intercepted
and harvested by the gear.
The assumptions for uncertainty result in a choice problem that is solved in two stages. In the first
stage, z is chosen based on the known distribution of φ. In the second stage φ is realized yielding a
set of harvest possibilities defined by the technology in (1). Hereafter we use H(z, φ) = (h1, h2) to
denote the stage II feasible harvest set. Given (z, φ), a is optimally chosen to maximize revenues
given (exogenous) market prices and regulations governing landings.
2.1 Regulations
The fishery is managed with a property rights-based approach. The manager issues a fixed number
of harvest permits for each stock or group of stocks. Fishermen can legally land a quantity of fish
that corresponds to his permit holdings. We assume the regulator has identified aggregate harvest
quantities for each stock which meet management objectives. The aggregate quota levels are fixed
hereafter. Our focus is harvesting, discard, and economic rent outcomes under a fixed total quota,
and varying operating rules which dictate the nature of quota trading and the quota flexibility. We
first define the concept of quota flexibility. We then introduce post harvest quota trading.
Let qi denote the quota for stock i. Landings, denoted li cannot exceed harvests, li ≤ hi. There
is no cheating in our model and therefore landings of a single fisherman cannot exceed the quota
they possess. Following Singh and Weninger (2009) we assume there is no regulatory penalty for
discarding. Fishermen can costlessly discard catch overages, hi > li, at sea.
Hereafter quota flexibility will refer to a stipulation in the regulation that allows a portion of the
stock i quota to be used to land stock j fish. The regulation takes a simple form. We use α ∈ [0, 1]
to denote the proportion of stock i quota that can be used to legally land stock j fish. If a fisherman
holds a pair of quotas (q1, q2), the eﬀective landings constraint under quota flexibility becomes
li ≤ qi + αqj ,
l1 + l2 ≤ q1 + q2,
for i = 1, 2, and i 6= j. Below we focus attention on the case of no flexibility α = 0 and limited
flexibility, 0 < α < 1.4
All cases examined below will assume the existence of a pre-harvest, hereafter a primary, quota
trading market. Primary quota trades occur simultaneously with input choices, that is, before
the fishermen go to sea, and before the uncertainty over the stock composition is resolved. The
second quota balancing provision allows for additional post harvest quota trades. Some early quota
programs required all quota trades be registered and approved by the regulating body. Time lags
were required for trades to be approved, which introduced frictions in quota markets. An alternative
regulatory environment places no restrictions on quota exchanges among fishermen. To capture
4Limited flexibility is currently used in the Gulf of Mexico grouper and tilefish individual quota program. The
regulation allows fishermen to use a portion of red grouper quota to land gag groupers, and vice versa. Similar
provisions are included for other shallow and deep water groupers and other reef fish species.
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the no-trade-restrictions environment we will study a second class of regulations for which a post
harvest, or secondary quota trading market exists.
As is standard in the fisheries economics literature we will begin by defining a first best outcome
which could be achieved under centralized control of fishing activities, i.e. the sole owner outcome.
We then compare outcomes under the regulatory instruments introduced above, with and without
flexibility, and with and without a secondary quota trading market to the sole owner optimum .
2.2 Sole owner problem
The sole owner takes the fish and input prices as given and chooses harvest inputs. At this point
φ is uncertain, but the sole owner can visualize his choice of a and actual harvests for all possible
realizations of φ. The problem is solved backwards.
2.2.1 Stage II
In the second stage, given z, the individual fisherman’s problem is:
Π =
h
(p1 − er1)A1 ³1 + sin(aπ
2
)
´
φγ + (p2 − er2)A2 ³1 + cos(aπ
2
)
´
(1− φ)γ)
i
· zβ − w z,
where p1 and p2 are fish stock prices, w is the input price, and er1 and er2 are the shadow prices of
the in situ fish stock.5
The necessary condition for an optimal a is given by:
a˜ =
2
π
tan−1
∙
A1
A2
p1 − er1
p2 − er2
µ
φ
1− φ
¶γ¸
(2)
Notice that when φ = 12 , A1 = A2, and p1 = p2, for any value of γ, a = φ.
6 When φ = 0, a = 0,
{u1, u2} = {0, 2A2} zβ when φ = 1, then a = 1 and {u1, u2} = {2A1, 0} zβ. Thus, while the feasible
choice set of a is [−1, 2] , its optimal values are confined in the subset [0, 1]; essentially, [−1, 0] and
[1, 2] are strictly dominated areas (see also Singh and Weninger, 2009). The harvest of both stocks
is higher for a ∈ [0, 1].
2.2.2 Stage I
In stage I z is chosen to maximizing ex-ante profits:
Π = Eφ
∙
(p1 − er1)A1µ1 + sin( a˜ (φ)π
2
)
¶
φγ + (p2 − er2)A2µ1 + cos( a˜ (φ)π
2
)
¶
(1− φ)γ)
¸
· zβ −w z
where a˜ (φ, p) solves the second stage choice of a as given by (2). The necessary condition for
optimal z is:
z˜ =
⎡
⎣β
Eφ
h
(p1 − er1)A1 ³1 + sin( a˜(φ)π2 )´φγ + (p1 − er1)A2 ³1 + cos( a˜(φ)π2 )´ (1− φ)γ)i
w
⎤
⎦
1
1−β
, (3)
which we see is a function of prices, technology parameters and stock conditions as reflected in the
distribution of φ. If fishermen are identical, as we assume, the ex ante input choice is identical.
5To simplify the presentation we have assumed the sole owner has derived the solution to the infinite horizon
planning problem under given bioeconomic conditions and thus knows the shadow prices of the individual stocks.
6 In general, with α = 0.8,over a large range of φ ∈ [0.2, 0.8], α ' φ, when p1 = p2.
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2.2.3 Stage II harvests
The harvests of a fisherman realizing a stock mix φ are:
h1 (φ) = A1
µ
1 + sin
µ
a˜ (φ)π
2
¶¶
φγ z˜β;
h2 (φ) = A2
µ
1 + cos
µ
a˜ (φ)π
2
¶¶
(1− φ)γ z˜β.
The uncertainty captures that some fisherman will end up harvesting more of stock 1 and less of
stock 2, while for others the reverse will be true. Notice that uncertainty over φ translates into
uncertainty of harvests in two dimensions. Aggregate harvests are evaluated over the unit mass of
fishermen:
h∗1 = A1z
∗βEφ
½µ
1 + sin
µ
a∗ (φ)π
2
¶¶
φγ
¾
;
h∗2 = A1z
∗βEφ
½µ
1 + sin
µ
a∗ (φ)π
2
¶¶
φγ
¾
It is easy to see that with no uncertainty, all fishermen obtain an identical realization of φ. Then
hi = h∗i .
A few additional features of the sole owner solution are worth noting. First, if pi > 0 and discarded
fish do not survive, all harvested fish will be landed at port. If discarded fish die they yield no
reproductive value whereas landing the fish yields the unit price pi.
The next sections consider outcomes under decentralized management. We begin with a regulation
that does not oﬀer fishermen flexibility, α = 0, and contrast outcomes, harvests, inputs and rents
with and without a secondary quota market.
2.3 No flexibility, with post-harvest quota trades
Under this regulation, individual fisherman choose {q1, q2} and z in stage I with the goal of max-
imizing private expected profits. The per unit price of quotas will be {r1, r2}. The optimization
problem is solved recursively.
2.3.1 Stage II
The fishermen here enter with already purchased quotas {q1, q2} and input choice of z. If they want
to harvest and land more or less than their existing quota, they can enter the secondary market. It
bears emphasis that without any aggregate uncertainty and without any transactions costs, quota
prices in the secondary market will be identical to prices in the primary market (no arbitrage profits
will exist in equilibrium).7
Now, the ex-post profit maximization problem is
Π (φ) = p1l1 + r1(q1 − l1) + p2l2 + r2(q2 − l2)
= (p1 − r1) l1 + (p2 − r2) l2 + r1q1 + r2q2; s.t. li ≤ hi;
7 It can be easily shown by combining stage 1 and 2 problems.
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and where hi are given by (1). The Lagrangean for the problem is:
L = (p1 − r1) l1 + (p2 − r2) l2
+μ1 (h1 − l1) + μ2 (h2 − l2) + r1q1 + r2q2
The choice variables are {l1, l2} and a. The necessary conditions are:
pi − ri = μi; μi ≥ 0; μi (hi − li) = 0 (4a)
a˜ =
2
π
tan−1
∙
μ1
μ2
A1
A2
µ
φ
1− φ
¶γ¸
(4b)
Thus, when stock 1 is discarded r1 = p1, and a˜ = 0; if stock 2 is discarded r2 = p2, and a˜ = 1.
Given dockside prices {p1, p2} and quota prices {r1, r2} the optimal harvest responses are completely
determined by their idiosyncratic realization of φ in the second stage.
2.3.2 Stage I
In stage I fishermen can foresee the stage II optimal response to all possible realizations of φ. Those
responses determine their harvests, landings and revenues. In particular, given the dockside prices
(exogenous) and quota prices (endogenously determined in the equilibrium but fixed at the time
a is chosen), they can also see what point in the feasible set will be chosen. For example if the
stock i quota price is equal to the dockside price, stock i will be discarded yielding an outcome at
the corner of the harvest set H(z, φ). For interior cases, landings will depend on the realization
of φ. State contingent landings revenues for all (z, φ) are known and the stage I problem is thus
to maximize expected profits by choosing optimal z and {q1, q2}. In a quota market equilibrium,
{q1, q2} will be equal the quotas set by the manager and thus we solve for the equilibrium quota
(rental) prices. In turn, these quota prices indicate whether stage II choices are at corners or in the
interior of H(z, φ). In other words, φ-contingent stage II behavior must be consistent with quota
prices determined in stage I as well as the priced that prevail (by arbitrage) in stage II.
We next solve for the optimal choices under all possible outcomes that can arise in stage II.
• No quotas bind, i.e. ri = 0 for both i;
This case has already been discussed in Section 2.2 above.
• Both quota bind but neither is in the discard region, i.e., pi > ri > 0 for both i
Recall that when quota of stock i binds ri > 0; if it does not ri = 0. First note that in a no-discard
equilibrium
q1 = zβA1Eφ
½
φγ
∙
1 + sin
∙
tan−1
∙
p1 − r1
p2 − r2
A1
A2
µ
φ
1− φ
¶γ¸¸¸¾
; (4ea)
q2 = zβA2Eφ
½
(1− φ)γ
∙
1 + cos
∙
tan−1
∙
p1 − r1
p2 − r2
A1
A2
µ
φ
1− φ
¶γ¸¸¸¾
, (4eb)
where a˜ has been substituted from (4a) and (4b). An optimal choice of z is obtained by maximizing:
Π = Eφ
⎡
⎣ (p1 − r1)A1
³
1 + sin
h
tan−1
h
p1−r1
p2−r2
A1
A2
³
φ
1−φ
´γii´
φ
γ
+(p2 − r2)A2
³
1 + cos
h
tan−1
h
p1−r1
p2−r2
A1
A2
³
φ
1−φ
´γii´
(1− φ)γ)
⎤
⎦ · zβ
| {z }
Eφ[(p1−r1)q1+(p2−r2)q2]
− w z
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which readily obtains:
wz = β ((p1 − r1) q1 + (p2 − r2) q2) (4f)
Equation (4f) simply states that the share of revenues allocated to input cost is β as expected from
the production technology. Thus (4ea) - (4f) obtain the three unknowns r1, r2, and z; the rest are
either parameters or policy variables.
Quota i binds, no quotas in discard region, pi > ri > 0; rj = 0
The equilibrium is identical as in (b) except that ri = 0 for the stocks for which the quota does not
bind.
Both quotas bind, one stock’s quota is in discard region, e.g., pi > ri > 0; rj = pj
Let q1 be in the discard region. (By symmetry, a similar equilibrium will hold if stock 2 is instead
in the discard region.) Then, the set of equations that define the equilibrium z and r2 are
q2 = zβA2Eφ {2 (1− φ)γ} , (4ga)
wz = β (p2 − r2) q2 (4gb)
An example: Let φ be uniform on [φmin, φmax]. Then, using (4ga), one gets
z =
∙
q2 (α+ 1)
2A2
φmax − φmin
(1− φmin)γ+1 − (1− φmax)γ+1
¸ 1
β
r2 = p2 −
wz
βq2
On the other hand for the discard of stock 1 to be positive
d1 = zβA1
Z
φγf (φ) dφ| {z }
h1
− q1
=
q2
2
A1
A2
φγ+1max − φ
γ+1
min
(1− φmin)γ+1 − (1− φmax)γ+1
− q1 > 0
Thus, discard of stock 1 occurs when
q1
q2
<
1
2
A1
A2
φγ+1max − φ
γ+1
min
(1− φmin)γ+1 − (1− φmax)γ+1
For a uniform distribution with E (φ) = 12 and A1 = A2; the above reduces to
q1
q2
<
1
2
One quota is slack and the other is in the discard region, for example, ri = 0 and rj = pj .
Is the same as above, but with r2 = 0.
2.4 No flexibility, no post-harvest trades
We next assume that fishermen head out to the sea with {q1, q2} as landing constraints, and no
further quota trade occurs.
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2.4.1 Stage II
Now, the ex-post profit maximization problem is:
Π = p1l1 + p2l2; s.t. li ≤ qi and li ≤ hi;
if li < hi, then li = qi; if li < qi, then li = hi
Notice that here we allow landing to be less than the quota since a fisherman might enter with a
quota that ex-post is not feasible with his realized H(z, φ); i.e., quotas exceed feasible harvests.
The Lagrangean for the above problem is:
L = p1l1 + p2l2 + λ1 (q1 − l1) + λ2 (q2 − l2)
+μ1 (h1 − l1) + μ2 (h2 − l2)
The necessary conditions for optimal lis are:
pi = λi + μi; λi ≥ 0, μi ≥ 0, μi (hi − li) = 0;
λiμi = 0
While λi > 0 implies that i’s landing is constrained by its quota, μi > 0 means that li is constrained
by technology; μi = 0 implies that stock i fish is discarded. As the fisherman can choose any point
in H(z, φ), there may lie a continuum of points that allow full utilization of the available quota but
yield diﬀerent levels of discards. We will assume the fisherman chooses the harvest combination
that minimizes fish wastage in terms of its monetary value. Since the fisherman is already utilizing
his quota, this appears to be a reasonable assumption to make.
When no discard takes place, i.e., μi = pi for both i, then harvests are determined by:
a˜ =
2
π
tan−1
∙
μ1
μ2
A1
A2
µ
φ
1− φ
¶γ¸
If any μi = 0, on the other hand, stock i is under a (possibly continuum of) discard options. Here,
following the assumption discussed above, given q = {q1, q2}, z, and the realized φ, we choose a
that governs the harvest vector such that:
a˜ (q1, q2, z, φ) = argmin
a
{p1 (h1 − q1) + p2 (h2 − q2) : hi (a, z, φ) ≥ qi, i = 1, 2} (8)
where hi (a, z, φ) ∈ H(z, φ). There are two main cases to consider
{q1, q2} lies in the interior of H(z, φ) Clearly, there are a continuum of points where {h1, h2} ≥
{q1, q2}. The choice here is completely governed by (8).
{q1, q2} lies outside H(z, φ) There are many sub-cases to consider here. First define½
h˜imin = min{hi ∈ H(z, φ)}
h˜imax = max{hi ∈ H(z, φ)}
¾
as the stock i’s minimum and maximum harvests in the set H(z, φ). Then:
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• q1 < h˜1min, q2 < h˜2max
Here, the optimal choice of a < 0 is such that
h2 = q2
The case q2 < h˜2min, q1 < h˜1max is symmetric.
• q1 < h˜1min, q2 > h˜2max
a = 0
Symmetrically, for q1 > h˜1max, q2 < h˜2min
a = 1
• h˜1max > q1 > h˜1min
a = arg max
a∈[0,aˆ]
{p1h1 + p2h2 : h1 (aˆ) = q1}
Symmetrically, for h˜2max > q2 > h˜2min
a = arg max
a∈[aˆ,1]
{p1h1 + p2h2 : h2 (aˆ) = q2}
• q1 > h˜max, q2 > h˜2max
a =
2
π
tan−1
∙
p1
p2
A1
A2
µ
φ
1− φ
¶γ¸
2.4.2 Stage I
The analysis above determines the optimal a˜ (q1, q2, z, φ) for all z, {q1, q2}, for any realization of φ.
Thus, the choice of z, q1, q2 will be determined by
max
{z,q1,q2}
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Eφ
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
p1min
n
A1
³
1 + sin
h
a˜ (q1, q2, z, φ)
π
2
i´
φγ , q1
o
| {z }
l1(q1,q2,z,φ)
+
p2min
n
A2
³
1 + cos
h
a˜ (q1, q2, z, φ)
π
2
i´
(1− φ)γ , q2
o
| {z }
l2(q1,q2,z,φ)
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎭
zβ
−wz − r1q1 − r2q2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Notice that stage II optimal behavior as characterized by a˜ (q1, q2, z, φ) does not depend on quota
prices since no quota trade occurs in stage II. Since {q1, q2} is determined exogenously by the
regulator, the above expression determines the equilibrium quota prices.
2.5 Limited flexibility
We now consider a stock-specific quota regime that allows a fraction α of stock i quota to be used to
land stock j fish and vice versa. As before, we contrast outcomes with pre harvest quota trade only,
and the case of secondary quota trading period in stage II. Quota flexibility further complicates
the choice problem for the fisherman, as well as the equilibrium price determination in the quota
market(s). To build intuition, we first consider outcomes with no uncertainty. Harvest uncertainty
is reintroduced below.
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2.5.1 No uncertainty
The no uncertainty case is analogous to fixing φ. Here, all choice variables, (z, a, q1, q2) plus the
amount if any of the available quota i used to land stock j fish, can be made in stage I . The
fisherman’s profits are
Π = p1l1 + p2l2 − r1q1 − r2q2 − wz; s.t. li ≤ hi;
l1 ≤ q1 + αq2; l2 ≤ q2 + αq1; l1 + l2 ≤ q1 + q2
The Lagrangian for the problem is:
L = p1l1 + p2l2 − r1q1 − r2q2 + λ (q1 + q2 − l1 − l2)
ω1 (q1 + αq2 − l1) + ω2 (q2 + αq1 − l2)
+μ1 (h1 − l1) + μ2 (h2 − l2)− wz
Necessary conditions for optimal qi, li and hi include:
r1 = λ+ ω1 + αω2;
r2 = λ+ ω2 + αω1;
r1 − r2 = (1− α) (ω1 − ω2) = 0 if α = 1
λ ≥ 0;λ (q1 + q2 − l1 − l2) = 0
pi − λ− ωi − μi ≤ 0; li(pi − λ− ωi − μi) = 0
μi ≥ 0; μi (hi − li) = 0;
ω1 (q1 + αq2 − l1) = 0;ω2 (q2 + αq1 − l2) = 0;ωi ≥ 0
Clearly, if none of the landing constraints bind (individually), i.e., {l1, l2} is in the interior of
the range of quotas allowed, r1 = r2 = r = λ. Also, either ω1 or ω2 is zero; i.e., one of the
individual quota constraints is slack given the aggregate constraint. If constraint for stock i binds
then ri = rj+(1− α)ωi > rj , for i = 1, 2, i 6= j. If neither individual constraint binds, and neither
does the aggregate, i.e., λ = 0, then r1 = r2 = 0. If the aggregate does not bind, i.e., li+lj < qi+qj ,
but that of stock i binds, we have ri = ωi, and rj = αωi.
Further implications of the necessary conditions can be summarized as follows:
Aggregate constraint bids (λ > 0) :
• Neither individual constraint binds, ω1 = ω2 = 0, r1 = r2 = r:
a˜ (φ) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
= 2π tan
−1
h
p1−r
p2−r
A1
A2
³
φ
1−φ
´γi
if r < p1 and p2
= 0, if r ≥ p1 and r < p2
= 1, if r ≥ p2 and r < p1
Accordingly for the above three cases:
wz = β (p1 − r)h1 + β (p2 − r)h2;h1 + h2 = q ≡ q1 + q2;
wz = β (p2 − r)h2;h2 = l2 = h˜2max;h1 = h˜1min; l1 = q − h˜2max
wz = β (p1 − r)h1;h1 = l1 = h˜1max;h2 = h˜2min; l2 = q − h˜1max
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• Stock 1 individual constraint binds, ω1 > 0;ω2 = 0, r1 = r2 + (1− α)ω1:
l1 = q1 + αq2; l2 = (1− α) q2
Also,
a˜ (φ) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
= 2π tan
−1
h
p1−r1
p2−r2
A1
A2
³
φ
1−φ
´γi
if r1 < p1 and r2 < p2
= 0, if r1 ≥ p1 and r2 < p2
= 1, if r2 ≥ p2 and r1 < p1
Accordingly, for the above three cases:
wz = β (p1 − r1)h1 + β (p2 − r2)h2; h1 = l1;h2 = l2;
wz = β (p2 − r2) h˜2max; h˜2max = l2; h1 = h˜1min;
wz = β (p1 − r1) h˜1max; h˜1max = l1; h2 = h˜2min;
In the first case, there are four equations in four unknowns, a, z, r1, and r2. In the second
and third case a is either 0 or 1, z is determined from either h˜2max = l2 or h˜1max = l1, and
r1 or r2 is determined from the input choice necessary condition.
• The case where the stock 2 individual constraint binds, ω1 = 0;ω2 > 0 is symmetric.
Aggregate constraint slack (λ = 0) :
• If none of the individual constraints bind, r1 = r2 = 0, the conditions simplify as follows:
• ω1 > 0, ω2 = 0, then r2 = αr1. Here, l1 = q1 + αq2
a˜ (φ) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
= 2π tan
−1
h
p1−r1
p2−αr1
A1
A2
³
φ
1−φ
´γi
if r1 < p1 and αr1 < p2
= 0, if r1 ≥ p1 and αr1 < p2
= 1, if αr1 ≥ p2 and r1 < p1
Accordingly, for the above three cases:
wz = β (p1 − r1)h1 + β (p2 − αr1)h2;h1 = l1;
wz = β (p2 − αr1) h˜2max;h1 = h˜1min;
wz = β (p1 − r1) h˜1max;h2 = h˜2min;
In the first case there are three equations in three unknowns: z, r1, and a. In second and
third, we have two equations in two unknowns, r1 and z.
2.6 Flexibility with post harvest quota trade
We now re-introduce uncertainty to the model. In stage II {q1, q2} is fixed, however under flexibility,
the eﬀective quota, and thus the eﬀective landings constraint is defined by the pair {qˆ1, qˆ2}. Again,
we solve the decision problem beginning with stage II.
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Stage II The profit maximization problem is:
Π = p1l1 + p2l2 − r1 (qˆ1 − q1)− r2 (qˆ2 − q2) ; s.t. li ≤ hi;
l1 ≤ qˆ1 + αqˆ2; l2 ≤ qˆ2 + αqˆ1; l1 + l2 ≤ qˆ1 + qˆ2
Since q1 and q2 are at this point are given (as are the equilibrium prices r1 and r2), they do not
aﬀect the choice problem:
L = p1l1 + p2l2 − r1qˆ1 − r2qˆ2 + λ (qˆ1 + qˆ2 − l1 − l2)
ω1 (qˆ1 + αqˆ2 − l1) + ω2 (qˆ2 + αqˆ1 − l2)
+μ1 (h1 − l1) + μ2 (h2 − l2) + r1q1 + r2q2
The necessary conditions for optimal choice of qˆi, li and hi are identical to those of the certainty
case and are not repeated. The only diﬀerence is that at stage II, z is given. Fishermen enter with
the same z and {q1, q2} and, depending on the realization of φ, trade quotas and choose a point in
the feasible harvest set H(z, φ) to maximize landings revenue.
2.7 Flexibility, no post harvest trading
The profit maximization problem is:
Π = p1l1 + p2l2; s.t. li ≤ hi;
l1 ≤ qˆ1 + αqˆ2; l2 ≤ qˆ2 + αqˆ1; l1 + l2 ≤ qˆ1 + qˆ2
To save space the optimization analysis is not repeated (necessary conditions are available from the
authors). The next section presents numerical results for the model outcomes under the various
regulations.
3 Numerical Results
Symmetric prices, asymmetric quotas
The results in rows 1-3 of Table 1 report equilibrium harvests, landings, and discards as a percentage
of quotas, quota prices, the factor input allocated to fishing operations, and the profit earned. The
results are reported for the four regulation combinations studied above, and for three price and
quota scenarios. Hereafter we abbreviate the regulations as follows: no flexibility, no post-harvest
trade (NF-NT); no flexibility, with post harvest trade (NF-T); flexibility, no post-harvest trade (F-
NT), and flexibility, with post harvest trade (F-T). The parameter space for our model is large and
the numerical results that follow are clearly not exhaustive. The results we present are intended to
be representative of conditions that may be encountered in quota-managed fisheries.
All results in Table 1 assume φ is uniformly distributed on the interval [0.3, 0.7] with mean value
0.5; the composition of fish stock is symmetric (see Figure 1). The technology parameters are set
to A1 = A2 = 1, γ = 0.8, and β = 0.7. The input price is w = $1.
In the first scenario of Table 1, prices are symmetric, p1 = p2 = $1, but quotas are set asymmet-
rically with stock 1 quota relatively scarce; q1 = .3, and q2 = .6. Results indicate that under the
NF-NT regulation (row 1), the stock 2 harvest falls slightly below its quota while at the same time
stock 2 fish, as well as stock 1 fish are discarded. Discards of stock 1 are 3.3% of the stock 1 quota
while discards of stock 2 fish are 2.9% of its quota. Under uncertainty, some fishermen realize stock
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Symmetric prices, asymmetric quotas
Regulation Harvests Landings Discards (% of q) Quota prices Input Profit
Row Flex. Trade (h1, h2) (l1, l2) (d1, d2) (r1, r2) z Π
1. no no 0.31, 0.59 0.30, 0.57 3.3, 2.9 0.93, 0.58 0.34 0.53
2. no yes 0.30, 0.60 0.30, 0.60 0 , 0 1.00, 0.53 0.40 0.50
3. yes no 0.33, 0.57 0.33, 0.56 2.4, 2.3 0.87, 0.62 0.33 0.56
4. yes yes 0.36, 0.54 0.36, 0.54 0, 0 0.78, 0.27 0.35 0.55
Asymmetric prices and quotas
Regulation Harvests Landings Discards Quota prices Input Profit
Row Flex. Trade (h1, h2) (l1, l2) (d1, d2) (r1, r2) z Π
5. no no 2.73, 4.46 2.00, 4.00 36.0, 12.0 0.18, 1.07 6.53 7.47
6. no yes 2.00, 4.00 2.00, 4.00 0 , 0 1.00, 0.86 5.98 8.02
7. yes no 2.12, 4.12 1.94, 4.03 9.2, 2.16 0.84, 1.76 5.23 8.80
8. yes yes 2.10, 4.20 1.80, 4.20 15.0, 0.0 1.00, 0.97 6.41 7.99
Symmetric prices and quotas
Regulation Harvests Landings Discards Quota prices Input Profit
Row Flex. Trade (h1, h2) (l1, l2) (d1, d2) (r1, r2) z Π
9. no no 0.57, 0.57 0.57, 0.57 0,0 0.27, 0.27 0.49 0.65
10. no yes 0.60, 0.60 0.60, 0.60 0,0 0.41, 0.41 0.49 0.71
11. yes no 0.59, 0.59 0.59, 0.59 0,0 0.20, 0.20 0.49 0.68
12. yes yes 0.60, 0.60 0.60, 0.60 0,0 0.41, 0.41 0.49 0.71
Table 1: Numerical results. Rows 1-4 assume p1 = p2 = 1; q1 = 0.3 and q2 = 0.6; rows 5-8
assume p1 = 1, p2 = 3, q1 = 2, and q2 = 4; rows 9-12 assume p1 = p2 = 1, q1 = q2 = 0.6.
conditions that do not allow them to harvest their full quota, while others discard overages. The
paradoxical result of simultaneous quota under utilization and discarding of valuable fish occurs
when there is no possibility to make post harvest quota trades. Existence of a post-harvest trading
market remedies this problem, as shown in row 2 results, i.e., the NF-T regulation. Notice that
post harvest trading also leads to full utilization of the quotas.
Flexibility leads to interesting adjustments by fishermen. With F-NT (row 3 results), fishermen use
stock 2 quota to land stock 1 fish. While prices and stock conditions are symmetric, stock 1 quota
is scarce. Targeting the quota mix is costly with (on average) symmetric abundance. Fishermen
take advantage of the flexibility oﬀered in the regulation and land a mix of stocks that more closely
mirrors abundance.
Quota prices reflect the scarcity of the stock 1 quota. Notice, the quota price is equal to the
dockside price under the NF-T regulation in row 2. The quota and targeted harvest mix is on the
boundary of the discard set and thus marginal cost of harvesting a unit of stock 1 is zero; the price
fishermen will pay for this quota is just equal to the dockside price (Singh and Weninger, 2009).
A larger input allocation occurs under the NF-T regulation (row 2). This is due to the stringent
targeting eﬀorts undertaken by fishermen. The harvest ratio is h2/h1 = 2 under NF-T; it is smaller
under all other regulations. Targeting a mix of stocks that diﬀers from abundance is costly. The
existence of a secondary trading market helps incentivize fishermen to under take costly targeting
eﬀort. The equilibrium quota price indicates that the quota mix q2/q1 = 2 is at a boundary
(r1 = p1) in the sense that a further reduction in q1 (or increases in q2) would induce discarding.
In all but the NF-T regulation (see rows 1, 3 and 4 of Table 1) harvest, and therefore stock mortality,
diﬀers from the quota set by the regulator. The diﬀerence is caused by the lack of a secondary
quota market and discarding, or is the consequence of allowing flexibility. It may be possible to
manipulate quotas to implement a desired mortality target. It is clear however that a first best
outcome will not be achieved in the absence of post-harvest trading where discards occur, since
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discards must be zero under a first best outcome.
Asymmetric prices and quotas
Our second scenario assumes higher and asymmetric quota prices (p1 = $1, p2 = $3) and a larger
and asymmetric quota (q1 = 2, q2 = 4). The results are reported in rows 5-8 of Table 1. The results
follow a similar pattern as above with a few exceptions. First, we see that discard percentages have
increased considerably in all but the NF-T regulation (row 6). Notice that the allocation of inputs
is largest under the NF-NT regulation in row 5.8 When dockside prices are high, the allocation of
factor inputs is also high. Fishermen allocate inputs to balance the losses due to missed revenue
under a catch underage, with the cost of additional inputs. Discards are high with no post-harvest
trade because the opportunity cost of a catch underage is high. With post harvest quota trading
fishermen can sell unused quota, eliminating the cost of an underage. The result is less inputs
allocated to the fishery and no discards.
The results under the FT regulation show positive discards of stock 1 fish (15% of its quota). This
result is due to the sharp price diﬀerential at the dock, combined with the flexibility oﬀered under
the regulation. Notice that the fishermen use all available flexibility to land the higher price stock,
i.e., l2 = 4.2 = q2+αq1. This leave 1.8 units of quota which is used to land stock 1 fish. Harvesting
at this same stock mix is costly. Fishermen can save costs by harvesting a mix that more closely
mirrors the symmetric stock abundance, and discarding overages of stock 1 fish. Lastly, as required,
the equilibrium quota price is equal to the dockside price when discards are positive.
Symmetric prices and quotas
Our third scenario considers a fully symmetric fishery (prices are p1 = p2 = $1, and quotas are set
to q1 = q2 = 0.6). The results are reported in rows 9-12 of Table 1. An interesting result is the
lack of discarding under all forms of regulation. With symmetry fishermen choose harvests that
are interior to the discard sets under all realizations of stock uncertainty. Discard can occur in the
absence of a secondary quota trading market if fishermen have overages. However, for this result to
occur, fishermen must be willing to allocate factor inputs suﬃciently large to generate the overage.
The relative prices in our third scenario do not justify the additional allocation of inputs. Rather,
the profit maximizing input allocation yield landings less than the available quota in the absence
of secondary quota trading. On the contrary, post-harvest quota trading leads to full utilization of
the available quota.
We now examine fishing profits under the various combinations regulation and fishery conditions.
Note that profits have been calculated as the sum of dockside revenue less input costs, wz. Consider
the asymmetric fishery scenarios in Table 1 (results in rows 1-8). As noted above, targeting eﬀorts
tend to be most stringent in the presence of post-harvest quota trading. These eﬀorts close the
gap between harvests and quotas, and pay an additional benefit not reflected in a static measure
of fishing profits. Targeting aligns harvests with quotas, but comes at a cost in terms of additional
factors of production. A fishery sole owner who wishes to implement a particular stock mortality
and land whatever is harvested would incur these added targeting costs. That is, the costs required
to target a first best harvest goal and land the entire harvest are by definition part of the first best
management policy.
Notice that the rents obtained under flexibility with trade are lower relative to the case with no
8The increased variance in harvesting due to increased scale of production likely contributes to, and counfoud this
result. Further analysis is needed to isolate forces that determine the magnitide of discards.
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flexibility in quotas (compare line 8 with 6 in Table 1). When flexibility is allowed, given the
equilibrium lease prices, it is rational for fishermen to use 10% of their stock 1 quota (the profit due
to this stock is zero anyway since r1 = p1) to land stock 2 fish (and gain (3− 0.86) ∗ 0.2 = 0.428)
even though this requires an increase in input costs.
4 Conclusions
We have introduced a technology that captures the realistic property whereby fishermen in a
multiple-stock fishery can partially control the mix of stocks harvested by gear. We examine
the problem of discards caused by a mismatch between random harvests and quota holdings. Equi-
librium harvesting, landings, discards and economic performance under various quota regulations
designed to reduce discards were derived.
Our results show that regulations that oﬀer flexibility to fishermen do not eliminate discards.
Flexibility may create further unintended problems causing managers to loose control over aggregate
harvests in a fishery. Under flexibility, harvests and discards depend on prices, the targeting
technology and the relative abundance of stocks. Since prices, technologies and stock abundance
can be diﬃcult to observe, and quota flexibility can introduce added costs for managers responsible
for setting sustainable harvest policies.
We find, not surprisingly, that regulations which allow frictionless quota trading after random
harvests are realized, can eliminate at at-sea discards and enhance long term economic performance
in a rights-based fishery.
Our results provide important guidance for improving the design of quota management programs;
the most eﬀective quota balancing mechanism may involve a standard, no-flexibility, design with
no restrictions on quota trading among fishermen.
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